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A BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT FIT
FOR THE CONSTITUTION: THE
ELIMINATION OF PARTISANSHIP AND
SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS
SHANE NICHOLS*
I.

INTRODUCTION

One Senate report warns that the government’s persistent
budget deficits and unwillingness to act in a fiscally responsible
manner threatens America’s long-term prosperity.1 It warns that
the interest payments on the swelling national debt, three times
what it was ten years ago, is draining funding for education and
healthcare, and suggests that a balanced budget amendment is
needed to constrain further debt increases.2 Likewise, a report in
the House of Representatives states that the amendment is needed
to end the era of deficit spending and protect future generations,
which have no formal representation in the political process, from
having to bear the costs of the current culture of fiscal
irresponsibility.3 One Congressman warns that, “in the very near
future . . . we will have financial collapse [because] . . . [e]ven a
country as wealthy and powerful as the United States of America
cannot continue to pile debt after debt after debt upon the head of
its people.”4
These comments were not made in the wake of the current
economic crisis now plaguing the United States; they were made in
1995, when the national debt was $10 trillion lower and the
United States was entering into an economic boom, which lead to a
budget surplus.5 As they have many times before, politicians are
* JD Candidate, May 2013, The John Marshall Law School; BA in Journalism,
May 2008, University of Arizona. In memory of William Hicks.
1. S. REP. NO. 104-5, at 6 (1995).
2. Id.
3. H.R. REP. NO. 104-3, at 4-5 (1995).
4. Joe Barton, The Balanced Budget Amendment: Ending the Federal
FOUND.
(Jan.
15,
1995),
Spending
Binge,
HERITAGE
http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/the-balanced-budget-amendmentending-the-federal-spending-binge-bar.
5. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT,
FISCAL
YEAR
2012
350
(2011)
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/omb/budget/fy2012/assets/hist.pdf [hereinafter BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2012] (showing a budget surplus
583
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now driving for a balanced budget amendment (“BBA”) to the
Constitution.6 To this end, the proposals that have been offered in
the past must be reexamined, keeping in mind that an
unprecedented amount of debt incurred in the last decade and the
ever-changing global economy demands a fresh perspective on how
to ensure the fiscal responsibility that has eluded the country for
decades.
Laying the Foundation
This Comment proposes a BBA that is consistent with
traditional constitutional principles, free from partisan fiscal
ideology, and effective in mandating a balanced budget free from
any political “maneuvering”7 meant to circumvent the provision’s
requirements. This Comment does not aim to enter the debate as
to whether the Unites States should enact such an amendment.
Rather, it is written under the presumption that public sentiment
will demand such an amendment in the near future.8 It is of the
utmost importance that the enacted amendment be viewed as
legitimate by the American public and all major political groups.9
This is because enacting a balanced budget amendment that
includes partisan policy or ideology would inevitably delegitimize
the constitutional provision in the eyes of many citizens and
politicians, leading to significant political, social, and economic

for the years 1998-2001).
6. See Alan Greenblatt, After 15 Years, GOP Revives Balanced Budget
Idea, NPR (Aug. 2, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/08/02/138900281/after-15years-gop-revives-balanced-budget-idea (reporting on a renewed effort by
Republicans in particular to get a BBA enacted in an effort to curb the
extreme deficit spending that has become central to political discourse in the
United States).
7. See Theodore P. Seto, Drafting a Federal Balanced Budget that Does
What It Is Supposed to Do, 106 YALE L.J. 1449, 1453-55 (1997) (explaining
that while some proponents want to simply require a balanced federal budget,
others are intent on enacting an “antifederalist” amendment that would limit
the size and power of the federal government). Also, a poorly drafted BBA that
would allow Congress to remove certain debts or expenses from the budget
calculations could result in budgets that are balanced on paper, but make few
real changes. Id. at 1493. The author suggests a well-drafted BBA should be
enforceable, allow enough flexibility to accommodate necessary changes in the
budget, be politically neutral, and should not disrupt the balance of power in
the existing constitutional system. Id. at 1469.
8. See Greenblatt, supra note 6 (stating how public opinion polls show
that the public generally supports such an amendment). However, when
informed that the amendment might cut entitlements or education, support
drops off significantly. Id.
9. See Brendon Troy Ishikawa, The Stealth Amendment: The Impending
Ratification and Repeal of a Federal Budget Amendment, 35 TULSA L.J. 353,
382 (2000) (stating that “constitutional change . . . must rest on the
widespread public approval if we continue to claim to be a democracy”).
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stress to the country.10
This issue is particularly salient in light of the financial
problems currently plaguing the United States11 and Europe.12 In
response to this unparalleled economic crisis, the ever-present
calls to enact a balanced budget amendment have gained
momentum not seen since the middle of the 1990s, culminating in
votes for BBA proposals in both the House and Senate in 2011.13
The European Union already put forth such a provision.
Germany, which added a “debt brake” to its constitution in 2009,14

10. See id. at 353-54, 370-71, 382 (predicting that a BBA will inevitably be
ratified, only to be repealed shortly thereafter due to misuse by politicians,
unworkable provisions, and eroding public support). The author also states
that “[w]aivers and accounting tricks will further erode respect for the
amendment to the extent that Congress and the public consider the
amendment ineffective.” Id. at 370.
11. See U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, U.S.
SENATE, WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL
COLLAPSE
1-11
(2011),
available
at
http://www.levin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/supporting/2011/PSI_
WallStreetCrisis_041311.pdf (explaining how in fall 2008, America suffered a
tremendous economic collapse where debt markets froze, stock markets
plunged, and storied financial firms failed). This collapse plunged the country
into a recession in which it is still mired. Id. The report cites a number of
factors that led to the fall, including high-risk lending, regulatory failures,
inflated credit ratings, and investment bank abuses. Id.
12. See Economic Crisis: Europe on the Brink, THE WEEK (Sept. 30, 2011),
http://theweek.com/article/index/219731/europe-on-the-brink (exploring the
current state of the crisis in Europe and the events that led to it). The crisis
started when Greece, which had accumulated debt equal to 160 percent of its
GDP, was unable to meet its debt payments and required a $140 billion
bailout from other euro zone members. Id. Fear then spread among investors
and creditors that other heavily indebted EU countries, such as Spain,
Ireland, Portugal, and Italy, would be unable to pay their debts in the future
as well. Id. These worries have caused the price of borrowing to increase,
making a default even more likely. Id.; see also Nicholas Kulish, Germany
Approves Bailout Expansion, Leaving Slovakia as Main Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/30/world/europe/withgermany-in-fold-slovakia-is-next-to-vote-on-euro-fund.html (reporting that
Germany has agreed to increase their bailout funds to $287 billion, subject to
approval by all seventeen EU countries, which is viewed as a significant step
in avoiding a Greek default that would have a significant negative
ramifications for the EU economy).
13. See Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, § 201, 125 Stat.
240, 250-51 (mandating a vote in the House and Senate on a “[j]oint resolution
proposing a balanced budget amendment” sometime between Sept. 30, 2011
and Dec. 31, 2011).
14. See Derek Scally, Debt Brakes and Sustainable Fiscal Reforms Berlin’s
TIMES
(Jan.
29,
2011),
Price
to
Support
Euro,
IRISH
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ ireland/2011/0129/1224288526685.html
(explaining how the German balanced budget provision works and why it was
enacted). The provision limits deficit spending to .35 percent of the
government’s GDP after 2016, and requires a completely balanced budget
after 2020. Id. The provision allows for additional borrowing in times of
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has called for all other European Union15 members to adopt
balanced budget measures to their own constitutions in a drive to
curb the fiscal irresponsibility that placed Union members in their
current predicament.16 The Union listened, and a new treaty that
requires governments to run balanced budgets or face sanctions
was signed by nearly all of its members.17 What was once regarded
as a proposal suited more for political rhetoric than actual
economic policy is rapidly becoming a popular approach to tackling
the debt issues that have encumbered the global economy.18 The
political landscape of the United States, however, presents
obstacles far different than those in Europe.
Once the context of the BBA issue is properly established,19
Section II of the Comment identifies the general constitutional
emergency and over the course of an economic cycle, but mandates that the
borrowing be accompanied by a repayment plan. Id.
15. Map of Euro Area 1999-2011, EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK,
http://www.ecb.int/ euro/intro/html/map.en.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2013).
The European Union is a group of twenty-seven European countries. Id. This
is not to be confused with the euro zone, which is a group of seventeen
countries within the European Union that share the euro as their currency. Id.
The euro zone members include Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Finland, Ireland,
Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands,
Austria, Portugal, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Id.
16. See Nicola Clark, Sarkozy and Merkel Vow Fiscal Unity for Euro
TIMES
(Aug.
16,
2011),
Nations,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/17/business/global/merkel-arrives-in-paris-tobegin-economic-talks-with-sarkozy.html
(reporting
that
the
German
chancellor and French president have proposed that all seventeen EU
countries implement balanced budget provision to their own constitutions).
17. See Paul Taylor & Julien Toyer, Europe Signs Up to German-Led
(Jan.
31,
2012),
Fiscal
Pact,
REUTERS
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/31/us-eu-summitidUSTRE80S0SR20120131 (explaining how twenty-five of twenty-seven
European Union states have agreed to the pact, which centers around budget
discipline and contains provisions that require members to adhere to EU
budget deficit limits and enshrine balanced budget rules into their laws).
18. See Chye-Ching Huang & Hannah Shaw, Proposed Balanced Budget
Amendment Is Extreme by International Standards, CENTER ON BUDGET AND
POL’Y PRIORITIES 2-3 (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.cbpp.org/files/12-6-11bud.pdf
(explaining that Switzerland, Germany, Italy, and Spain have all adopted
BBAs in light of the European Union public debt crisis, and European leaders
expect all member nations to enshrine similar BBAs into their own
constitutions in the near future). The article goes on to explore the difference
between the proposals in the United States compared to those in Europe. Id.
at 1-3, 7-8.
19. A brief synopsis of the United States’ amendment process may be
appropriate. An amendment to the Constitution requires two-thirds of both
Houses to approve the measure, which then gets sent to the states for
ratification. U.S. CONST. art. V. Either the legislatures of three-fourths of the
states or ratifying conventions in three-fourths of the states must then
approve the amendment for it to become part of the Constitution. Id. The
amendment may also originate in the states, but this Comment focuses on
proposals that originate within Congress. Id.
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principles an amendment must adhere to, and why they differ
from that of ordinary legislation.20 Section III analyzes past and
current BBA proposals, as well as those currently enacted in
Europe, to identify the elements common to such proposals and
the goals they seek to effectuate. These elements will then be
evaluated according to the constitutional considerations discussed
in Section II. The potential consequences of enacting these
proposals will also be discussed. Section IV synthesizes Sections II
and III of this Comment to propose a purely “procedural” BBA that
would achieve the fiscal goals of the United States government
without being burdened by political partisanship or overly
constraining guidelines that would make the amendment
unworkable or ineffective.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Return of the Balanced Budget Amendment
In the face of a global financial crisis and the federal
government hitting its debt ceiling of over $14 trillion, many
politicians refused to authorize any additional borrowing unless
cost-saving measures were enacted.21 These often contemptuous
debates between politicians culminated in The Budget Control Act
of 2011,22 which raised the debt ceiling while implementing
spending cuts achieved through various means.23 The legislation
20. See James M. Buchanan, Clarifying Confusion About the Balanced
Budget Amendment, 48 NAT’L TAX J. 347, 349-50 (1995) (defining
constitutional politics as “choices among rules” and ordinary politics as
“choices within rules”); see also David E. Kyvig, Refining or Resisting Modern
Government? The Balanced Budget Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 28
AKRON L. REV. 97, 124 (1995) (paraphrasing John Marshall in saying “[t]hose
supporting or opposing a balanced budget amendment should never forget it is
a constitution they are amending”). This is offered as a reminder that there is
a permanency to an amendment not present in ordinary legislation, and
society is stuck with the consequences of whatever decision it makes. Id.
21. See Paul Davidson, A Primer on the Debt-Ceiling Debate, USA TODAY,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2011-07-28-debt-ceilingquestions_n.htm (last updated July 29, 2011) (explaining how Republicans are
using the debt-ceiling vote as a way to demand cuts in the federal deficit and
examining the potential ramifications of defaulting on debt payments because
no funds are available); see also Mark Sappenfield, Debt-Ceiling Crisis: Why
Won’t Republicans Compromise?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 30, 2011),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/The-Vote/2011/0730
/Debt-ceilingcrisis-Why-won-t-Republicans-compromise (explaining how President Reagan
and President H.W. Bush agreed to tax hikes in 1982 and 1990 in exchange for
spending cuts that never materialized, and how Republicans are now
requiring guaranteed cuts before voting to raise the ceiling). The BBA
proposal is way for Republicans to ensure future cuts are made. Id.
22. § 201, 125 Stat. at 250-51.
23. The law increases the debt ceiling somewhere between $2.1 and $2.4
trillion and mirrors that in spending cuts. Jeanne Sahadi, Debt Ceiling: What
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also contained a provision mandating votes on a BBA proposal in
both the House and Senate.24 But, the vote failed in both houses.25
Republicans in particular have had a BBA on their agenda for
decades,26 but the global financial crisis and the tremendous
deficit spending of the United States government has given the
proposal a particularly potent resurgence. Save for a few
examples, the BBA proposals that have circulated Congress on a
yearly basis typically have too little support to be debated
seriously.27 But in 1982,28 1995, and 1997, the amendment came
particularly close to being sent to the states for ratification. In
1995 the amendment passed in the House with the required twothirds vote, but was defeated in the Senate 66-34, only a single
vote shy of the necessary super-majority.29 In 1997, the measure
the
Deal
Will
Do,
CNNMONEY
(Aug.
2,
2011),
http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/01/news/economy/debt_ceiling_breakdown_of_de
al/index.htm?iid=EL. The initial $917 billion in cuts are achieved by capping
domestic and defense spending over ten years. Id. A bipartisan committee will
then propose another $1.2 to $1.5 trillion in cuts over the next ten years, and
the debt ceiling will be raised in direct proportion. Id. If the committee cannot
agree on a spending cut plan, or Congress votes down the proposal, $1.2
trillion in cuts equally across defense and non-defense spending will
automatically initiate. Id. However, programs that help low-income citizens
such as food stamps, Social Security, Medicaid, and others will be exempt from
the cuts. Id.
24. § 201, 125 Stat. at 250-51.
25. See House Rejects Balanced Budget Amendment, USA TODAY (Nov. 18,
2011), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2011-11-18/balancedbudget-amendment-house-vote/51297960/1 (reporting that the first House vote
on a BBA in sixteen years failed to garner the required two-thirds votes
ending in a 261-165 vote in favor of the BBA). The measure fell twenty-three
votes short of passing. Id.; Senate Rejects Two Balanced Budget Amendments,
TODAY
(Dec.
14,
2011),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/
USA
washington/story/2011-12-14/senate-balanced-budget-amendmentvotes/51914134/1 (reporting that both the Democrat and Republican proposals
failed to garner a two-thirds vote, with all but a single Republican voting
against the Democratic proposal and all Democrats voting against the
Republican proposal).
26. Nancy C. Staudt, Constitutional Politics and Balanced Budgets, 1998
U. ILL. L. REV. 1105, 1107-08 (1998). “Federal legislators have considered the
merits of balanced budgets in congressional hearings every year for almost two
decades . . . .” Id.
27. Id. at 1108.
28. See S.J. Res. 58, 97th Cong. (1982) (proposing an amendment that
would require Congress to adopt a budget each year in which total outlays do
not exceed total receipts unless Congress reaches a three-fifths vote to allow
otherwise, and also requiring tax increase limitations, and a cap on the debt
ceiling); see also Ernest Istook, Considering a Balanced Budget Amendment:
FOUND.
(July
14,
2011),
Lesson
from
History,
HERITAGE
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/07/considering-a-balancedbudget-amendment-lessons-from-history (discussing how the 1982 BBA
proposal passed the Senate 69-31, the first time such a proposal has ever
passed either body of Congress, but was never passed in the House).
29. See H.J. Res. 1, 104th Cong. (1995) (proposing a BBA that forbids total
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was defeated in the Senate by the same margin.30 Proponents of
these amendments aimed to curb the constant deficit spending and
stop the accumulation of debt, the same reasons cited by today’s
advocates.31 The context, however, has changed drastically.
At the end of 1995, the total federal deficit stood at almost $5
trillion after the deficit for the year reached $163.9 billion.32 A
strong economy and increased tax revenue brought the deficit
down to $22 billion in 1997, before four straight years of a budget
surplus.33 Support for the amendment faded from the political
forefront as the nation prospered.34 Now, the modern debate has
returned in the wake of a struggling economy, four straight years
with deficits over $1 trillion, and a total national debt of over $15
trillion.35 These unprecedented circumstances compel a fresh
evaluation of the arguments and rationales offered in past
discussions.
However, the United States is not alone in their debt troubles,
outlays from exceeding total receipts in a fiscal year unless three-fifths of each
house of Congress votes to allow a specific excess). The other provisions in the
bill include a prohibition on increases of the public debt limit unless threefifths of each House approves, a prohibition on bills that increase revenue
unless approved by a majority in each House, and the allowance of a waiver to
the amendment when there is a declaration of war in effect or the country
faces military threat. Id.; see also Istook, supra note 28 (recounting how this
was the only BBA proposal the House had ever given super-majority approval
for, and how it ultimately failed in the Senate by a single vote).
30. See S.J. Res. 1, 105th Cong. (1997) (proposing a BBA that parallels the
1995 version that passed the house); see also Helen Dewar & Eric Pianin,
Budget Amendment Barely Loses in Senate, WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 1997),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp
srv/politics/special/budget/stories/030597.htm (highlighting how the BBA
proposal lost by a single vote in the Senate for the second time in three years,
and examining the political discourse surrounding the final vote).
31. See, e.g., Balanced Budget Amendment Fails to Clear House Vote,
(Nov.
18,
2011),
FOXNEWS.COM
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/11/18/house-rejects-balanced-budgetamendment/ (reporting that the proponents of the current proposal, a mirror
of the 1995 version, argue that the amendment is needed to stop Congress
from overspending and overtaxing, which is hurting the economy); JAMES V.
SATURNO & MEGAN SUZANNE LYNCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41907, A
BALANCED BUDGET CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT: BACKGROUND AND
CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS 5-6, 9-10 (2011) (citing the arguments of BBA
proponents from the 1980s and 1990s as support for proponents’ platform in
the current debate).
32. BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2012,
supra note 5, at 22, 140.
33. Id. at 5, 22.
34. See Dewar & Pianin, supra note 30 (describing how “the amendment
has lost much of its punch as the federal deficit has declined sharply in recent
years and White House and GOP negotiators inch toward a possible balanced
budget deal this year”).
35. BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2012,
supra note 5, at 140.
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as the European Union also struggles with its own financial
crisis.36 To ensure the Union’s future stability and fight the debt
that has wreaked havoc upon its economy, Germany led the way in
creating a treaty that requires all member countries to implement
balanced budget provisions into their constitutions or laws.37 This
pact will go into effect when twelve of the seventeen euro zone
members ratify the agreement.38 Two members, Germany and
Switzerland,39 previously enacted balanced budget provisions in
an effort to curb their own debt levels.40 Several others, Italy,
Spain, and France, have already initiated the process and have
started to move amendments through their own political
systems.41 These European models provide valuable insight on
36. Economic Crisis: Europe on the Brink, supra note 12.
37. Taylor & Toyer, supra note 17.
38. See John Irish & Elizabeth Pineau, France Gives Initial Green Light to
(Sept.
19,
2012),
EU
Fiscal
Pact,
REUTERS
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/19/us-eu-franceidUSBRE88I0L920120919 (explaining how Prime Minister Jean-Marc
Ayrault’s cabinet has approved of the compact and is set for an official
ratification in parliament soon). If twelve of the countries ratify the
agreement, it will go into effect January 1, 2013. Id.
39. Switzerland is not a euro zone member; it uses its own currency, the
Swiss Franc. Switzerland and the EU, INT’L SERVICE OF THE SWISS
BROADCASTING
CORP.
(Nov.
17,
2009),
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/country_information/country_profile/
Switzerland_and_the_EU.html?cid=5764106.
40. Scally, supra note 14; see Alain Grier, The Debt Brake – The Swiss
Fiscal Rule at the Federal Level, SWISS FED. FIN. ADMIN. (2011), available at
http://www.efv.admin.ch
/e/downloads/grundlagenpapiere_berichte/arbeiten_oekonomenteam/workingp
apers/Working_Paper_15_e.pdf (examining the reasons for enacting the 2003
Swiss debt brake, how the measure works, and the implications of the rule on
public debt and deficits). The Swiss debt brake requires that the budget be
balanced each year, limiting expenditures “to the amount of structural (or
cyclically adjusted) revenues.” Id. at 12. This adjustment takes into
consideration the country’s current economic position, allowing deficits during
recessions and requiring surpluses during times of economic strength. Id. at
12-14. Any deficits incurred must be factored into future expenditure
calculations so that income and expenditure maintains balance over time. Id.
at 12-15.
41. See Daria Contrada, Italian Government Proposes Bill on Balanced
Budgets, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 8, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO20110908-705597. html (reporting that in response to the country’s dangerous
levels of debt, the Italian Senate has approved a bill that would implement a
balanced budget amendment to the constitution). The plan aims to balance the
budget in 2013, subject to its approval by the lower house. Id.; see also David
Roman, Spain Cements Deficit-Cap Deal, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 27, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405311190478740457653157
0603579998.html (reporting that the Spanish government has agreed on a
plan to implement an amendment to their constitution that would include a
budget-deficit cap, and pass a separate law limiting deficits to 0.4 percent of
GDP starting in 2020); see also Clark, supra note 16 (reporting French
president Nicolas Sarkozy’s support of the plan to enact BBAs for all EU
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what specific provisions a BBA may contain, and how the
American proposals compare. In addition, the experiences of
Germany and Switzerland provide actual empirical evidence to
analyze, something not available in previous BBA discussions.
B. The Great Debate
In light of the recent BBA vote in Congress, American
politicians are again debating the controversial topic of what a
proposed amendment should look like. The term “balanced budget
amendment” is a generic term that does not prescribe any
particular method of operation.42 It merely represents the idea
that the government should be constitutionally bound to spend no
more than it takes in.43
Typical proposals include provisions that go beyond simply
requiring that government outlays not exceed government
receipts. They include provisions that attempt to guide fiscal
policy.44 The leading BBA proposals of the past and present are
widely viewed as vehicles to not only achieve a balanced budget,
but to also limit the overall size of government and make it
substantially more difficult for Congress to increase taxes.45 These
partisan-based goals are typically enacted through “substantive”
BBA provisions,46 which dictate the means by which the

members).
42. See Jeffrey A. Needelman, Deconstructing the Balanced Budget
Amendment: Fiscal Folly, Monetary Madness, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1289, 1294
(1997) (stating “[t]he Balanced Budget Amendment conceptualizes
government’s role in the economy as a metaphoric ledger of outlays and
receipts. Absent from this picture, however, is an adequate image of the unit
upon which this ‘balancing’ of taxing and spending is to take place”).
43. The amendments being proposed typically define a balanced budget as
one where outlays, payments being made, do not exceed receipts, money paid
to the government. See e.g., H.J. Res. 10, 112th Cong. (2011) (requiring a
balanced budget where “[t]otal outlays for any fiscal year shall not exceed total
receipts for that fiscal year”).
44. See e.g., H.J. Res. 1, 104th Cong. (1995) (requiring a three-fifths
majority vote to raise the debt ceiling and majority approval in each house to
allow any bill containing revenue increases to become law); see also S.J. Res. 1,
105th Cong. (1997) (requiring majority vote of each house to increase revenue);
see also S.J. Res. 4, 112th Cong. (2011) (implementing a provision that caps
spending at 20 percent of the prior year’s GDP); see also H.J. Res. 1, 112th
Cong. (2011) (requiring a three-fifths vote in each house to approve any bill
that imposes new taxes, increases tax rates, or increases total revenue).
45. See Staudt, supra note 26, at 1148 (explaining that “[m]any . . .
balanced budget advocates have expressed deep discontent with the growth in
the size of the national government . . . [and] [i]n hope of constraining the
federal government . . . have zealously pursued a balanced budget amendment
as a means for taming the leviathan”). Id.
46. See The Balanced Budget Amendment: An Inquiry into
Appropriateness, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1600, 1603-05 (1983) [hereinafter
Appropriateness] (criticizing S.J. Res. 58, supra note 28, because the

Do Not Delete

592

3/12/2013 7:22 PM

The John Marshall Law Review

[46:583

government is to achieve a balanced budget.47 For example, a
requirement that the government cannot raise taxes without
three-fifths approval in both the House and Senate is an example
of a substantive provision.48 Where, on the other hand, a
requirement that the government must enact a balanced budget
by 2020 is “procedural,” in that it sets an overall constraint by
limiting spending, but does not dictate how money will be spent.49
The difference between a “substantive” and “procedural” provision
is central to this Comment’s proposal, as it will ultimately show
that a purely procedural BBA would be in the country’s best
interest.50
Because a BBA must adhere to constitutional principles, it
must go beyond the requirements of an ordinary piece of
legislation.51 A constitutional amendment must embody an ideal
that is common to the American public as a whole, not just a
certain political group.52 If instead, a BBA rooted in some sort of
partisan ideology were enacted, it would risk being delegitimized
amendment’s requirements—a balanced budget, tax limitations, and a fixed
debt ceiling—are substantive provisions that “follow from a particular
economic theory”). The author does not propose any alternatives, he simply
offers a critique on the legislation at issue. See generally id.
47. Id.
48. Buchanan, supra note 20, at 351. The author was referring to a version
of a BBA debated in the House, but not passed, in 1995. Id.
49. See id. at 350-51 (distinguishing a procedural rule as one that
mandates the “procedures through which participants are allowed to reach
and to carry out decisions,” from a substantive one that “acts directly on the
outcomes”).
50. See generally id. (offering a response to the common criticisms of
requiring a BBA rather than achieving such through existing legislative
means). The author, a Nobel Prize-winning economist and BBA proponent,
frames his article by explaining the problems deficit spending cause for future
generations, and how politicians ignore these costs in order to satisfy the
current electorate. Id. He argues that politicians are unwilling to take on
unpopular deficit reduction because there is no way to ensure the measures
will stay in place and not be overturned by future politicians who take power.
Id. He suggests an amendment is needed to bind legislators to a balanced
budget and eliminate the electoral rotation that makes enduring fiscal policy
impossible. Id. However, the amendment must not include “substantive
direction as to how the federal budget [is] to achieve and maintain balance . . .
[as] any such rule would amount to constitutionalizing a specific economic
philosophy. Id.
51. See Seto, supra note 7, at 1177 (stating that “a well-drafted balanced
budget amendment should preserve existing constitutional provisions and
doctrines whenever possible”); Appropriateness, supra note 46, at 1601, 1603,
1606 (describing constitutional amendments as things that address flaws in
the process or structure of government and embody a lasting principal, not a
particular economic theory). “Economic policy is entirely alien to the enduring
principles defined in the Constitution.” Id. at 1606.
52. See Seto, supra note 7, at 1475-76 (proposing that a BBA should not
attempt to further any political goals, like the “antifederalist” provisions of
proposed BBAs that have been circulated through Congress previously).
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in the eyes of the American citizens and politicians who are
politically opposed to it.53 This type of fundamental disagreement
is suited for the legislative process, not the realm of constitutional
debate.54 Much of the BBA discourse of the past and present
focuses on the economic merits of the proposals themselves, but
fails to take these critical concerns into consideration.55
The fragile current state of the country and the world at large
make it imperative that if a BBA is enacted, it needs to be done
right.
III. ANALYSIS
In order to define what a BBA should look like, this Comment
first identifies the principles to which an amendment must adhere,
so it does not run afoul of the Constitution and delegitimize the
provision. Once this is established, the Comment draws upon
historical and current BBA proposals to pinpoint the
characteristics common to BBAs and evaluate them according to
constitutional considerations. This analysis results in a BBA
proposal that both respects the Constitution and is an effective
framework for achieving a balanced budget.
A. Constitutional Considerations
The Constitution is a rare entity that commands the respect
of the nation as a whole and is not typically subject to the
partisanship that divides the country in traditional politics. The

53. See id. at 1476 (explaining that “[a]n amendment that is viewed in part
as an attempt by a temporary antifederalist majority to legislate in
constitutional stone is more likely to be circumvented and less likely to
command continuing popular support when the political winds shift, as they
always do”).
54. See Appropriateness, supra note 46, at 1609 (suggesting that the goals
of the politicians who try to enact a BBA can be done within the existing
governmental powers, and a constitutional amendment to do such is
inappropriate). The author argues that amendments in the past have been
used to achieve objectives not attainable through existing governmental
powers, and it should stay that way. Id. While this does not support this
Comment’s position, it is an apt illustration of the commonly cited worry that
typical legislative discourse has no place in constitutional arguments, and it
should remain as such.
55. While researching this Comment, it became apparent that the unique
characteristics of a constitutional amendment requires one to evaluate how
the proposal would work in the context of the Constitution and its framework,
in addition to how it would work within the country’s economic framework.
Much of the commentary on the subject, and nearly all of the legislation
proposed by politicians, ignores this issue and seeks only to engage in
economics. This Comment draws upon this realization and attempts to connect
the logical nexus between how the Constitution works and how it can embody
an economic principle.
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stringent requirements of an amendment ratification56 reflects the
Framers’ intent to protect the document from being altered by
groups that are only temporarily in power and seek to impose their
ideology on future factions.57 To be accepted by both politicians
and the public, an amendment must adhere to certain principles
that transcend the ordinary legislative process and can be backed
by the collective conscious of the country.58 An amendment differs
from legislation in that it contains an aspirational statement
rather than a rigid rule of law,59 is flexible enough to conform to
modern trends,60 and is free from one particular group’s ideology.61
A BBA without these characteristics is destined to be repealed,
circumvented, or rendered ineffective.62
Most important, amendments are not the constitutional
equivalents of statutory law.63 Instead, amendments are enacted
because society has designated a certain value as one that should
56. See supra text accompanying note 19 (providing an overview of Article
V’s amendment ratification process).
57. See Great and Extraordinary Occasions, CENTURY FOUND. 10 (May 13,
2009), http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/32.pdf (stating that “legislators
have an obligation to do their best to avoid amendments that are no more part
of a momentary political bargain, likely to become obsolete as the social and
political premises underlying their passage wither or collapse”).
58. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 7-8 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 3d ed. 2006) (proposing that one of the
main reasons for the Constitution’s survival has been the American people’s
respect for the document and their desire to be governed by its principles).
59. See id. at 8 (articulating that the Constitution is written in “general
and abstract terms” that almost everyone in society can agree with). The
author cites freedom of speech embodied in the First Amendment as an
example of an aspirational value that everyone can stand behind, even if they
disagree over what exactly it should protect. Id.
60. See id. at 8 (citing interpretation as a reason a document written in the
eighteenth century can govern the “technological world of the late-twentieth
and twenty-first centuries”); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution
of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 438
(1985) (holding that “[i]nterpretation must account for the transformative
purpose of the text”). Justice Brennan also said that the Constitution has no
“static meaning,” it adopts its principles to current needs and issues. Id.; Great
and Extraordinary Expectations, supra note 57, at 10 (arguing that
constitutional amendments need to be cast in general terms to be enduring).
61. See id. at 4-5 (arguing that the “Constitution’s unifying force would be
destroyed if it came to be seen as embodying the views of any temporarily
dominant group . . . [and that] it would be a cardinal mistake . . . to effectively
‘read out’ of our foundational charter any segment of our society”).
62. See id. at 10-11 (using a proposed amendment banning flag
desecrations to illustrate how an amendment not consistent with
constitutional principles could “trivialize and undermine” respect for the
document). The authors say that if future generations who do not understand
or revere an amendment may view it as “the political victory of one faction in a
particular historical moment.” Id. at 11. The amendment would therefore be
delegitimized in the eyes of those citizens. Id.
63. 16 AM. JUR. 2D CONST. LAW § 2 (2011).
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transcend the mutable laws of the country and be permanently
emboldened in the nation’s framework.64 This framework should
contain only general principles, not specific guidelines that govern
the subject as a statute would.65 As Justice Marshall stated in
McCulloch v. Maryland, “[the Constitution’s] nature . . . requires,
that only great outlines should be marked, its important objects
designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those
objects, be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.”66
A BBA must observe this rule by stating an overall aspiration
that reflects a societal change in attitude.67 In this case, a BBA
would symbolize that Americans want to ensure future economic
stability by keeping the government’s budget balanced. This goal
should be distinguished from the means that can be used to
achieve that end.
Also, an amendment must be flexible enough to adapt to
unforeseen developments.68 This flexibility is achieved through
language that is open to interpretation, which allows the
government to enact whatever constitutional means are necessary
to further the principle at the heart of the amendment.69 As
Justice Brennan explained:

64. Id.
65. See Great and Extraordinary Occasions, supra note 57, at 10 (stating
“[i]n general, the nature of our Constitution is violated if amendments are too
specific in the sense that they reflect only the immediate concerns of one
generation, or if they set forth specifics more appropriate in implementing a
statute”).
66. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819). One of the issues in
this landmark case was whether the Constitution granted Congress the
authority to establish a bank. McCulloch v. Maryland, THE OYEZ PROJECT AT
IIT CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW, http://www.oyez.org/cases/17921850/1819/1819_0 (last visited Feb. 17, 2012). In holding that it did, Justice
Marshall articulated that the Constitution granted powers to Congress that
are not specifically enumerated in its text. Id. The quote explains how the
Constitution designates major objectives, but allows Congress to decide how to
achieve those ends.
67. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 58, at 12-14 (explaining how
amendments that reflect these societal changes are the most common of the
three types of amendments enacted subsequent to the Bill of Rights).
Chemerinsky cites the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments as
examples. Id. at 13. The other categories are amendments that overruled
specific Supreme Court decisions and those adopted to correct problems in the
original Constitution. Id.
68. See Id. at 8 (stating that “[i]nterpretation is crucial to allow a
document written for an eighteenth-century agrarian slave society to govern
in the technological world of the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries”).
69. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421 (stating “[l]et the end be legitimate, let it
be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional”).
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Our amended constitution is the lodestar for our aspirations. Like
every text worth reading, it is not crystalline. The phrasing is broad
and the limitations of its provisions are not clearly marked. Its
majestic generalities and ennobling pronouncements are both
luminous and obscure. This ambiguity, of course, calls forth
interpretation, the interaction of reader and text.70

This principle can be seen with the Ninth Amendment, which
states that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.”71 This language is not viewed as containing any particular
right, but holds that there are rights not enumerated in the
Constitution which are still protected.72 The United States
Supreme Court rarely engaged in interpreting the amendment
until Griswold v. Connecticut73 in 1965, when Justice Goldberg’s
concurring opinion found that the Ninth Amendment granted the
authority to protect non-textual rights.74 The Court found that the
right to privacy was such a right and should be protected under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.75 Broad
language, like that in the Ninth Amendment, allows the Court to
continually reinterpret the text and recognize additional implicit
rights as society continues to evolve.76
This sort of flexibility must be included in any amendment if
it is to progress with our mutable society. In the case of a BBA, it
must be able to account for unforeseen events like recessions and
wars that cannot be accounted for in advance.77 To achieve this,
the language of the amendment must be written broad enough to
allow the government to decide what means are best used to
combat these events, so long as they are within the framework of
the BBA.
An amendment must also be free from partisan ideology. By
its very definition, being partisan is being partial to a particular
person, party, or idea.78 An amendment must reflect the will of
American society as a whole, not a particular group. Again, Justice
Brennan is particularly insightful here: “[i]t is the very purpose of

70. Brennan, Jr., supra note 60, at 433.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
72. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 58, at 298 (stating that “[t]he Ninth
Amendment is a clear and open invitation for government to provide more
rights than the Constitution accords”).
73. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
74. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 58, at 794.
75. Id. at 815-16.
76. Id.
77. See SATURNO & LYNCH, supra note 31, at 35 (explaining that most BBA
proposals contain an exception that allows deficit spending in times of war or
emergency).
78. Partisan,
DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/partisan (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
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our Constitution . . . to declare certain values transcendent,
beyond the reach of temporary political majorities. The
majoritarian process cannot be expected to rectify claims of
minority right that arise as a response to the outcomes of that very
majoritarian process.”79 A partisan-laced BBA would be repugnant
to the Constitution as well as to the portion of society that does not
agree with those views. Such discontent would inevitably lead to
friction and call for the amendment’s repeal.80 For example, such a
situation is similar to the ratification and repeal of the Eighteenth
Amendment.81 To the dismay of many Americans, Prohibition was
enacted after years of lobbying from various groups.82 However,
because the amendment was not backed by the whole of society83
problems with enforcement and public sentiment resulted in its
repeal.84 Like Prohibition, a partisan BBA would leave a unified
group of citizens and politicians who disfavor the amendment and
demand its repeal. These types of disagreements are suited for the
legislative process, not constitutional politics.
B. BBAs and Their Compatibility with the Constitution
The BBAs proposed in the United States and the BBAs
enacted in Europe vary in their approach. The German
79. Brennan, Jr., supra note 60, at 436-37.
80. See generally Ishikawa, supra note 9, at 370-71 (predicting that in the
near future a BBA will have enough political momentum to be ratified, only to
be repealed once the amendment proves to be unworkable).
81. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
82. See
Prohibition,
HISTORY.COM,
http://www.history.com/topics/prohibition (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (recalling
how by the beginning of the twentieth century, temperance societies calling for
the prohibition of alcohol had become common and were continuing to spread
their influence across the country). Among those playing strong roles in the
movement were women who believed alcohol to be destructive to families,
religious groups who viewed the saloon culture as “ungodly,” and factory
owners who were interested in increasing efficiency and preventing accidents.
Id. The amendment was ratified on January 29, 1919, and went into effect one
year later. Id.
83. See, e.g., William Howard Doughty, Jr., The Case Against the
TIMES
(Mar.
10,
1918),
Prohibition
Amendment,
N.Y.
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archivefree/pdf?res=F60F12F63E5C1B728DDDA90994DB405B888DF1D3
(arguing
against the amendment because even if there are enough votes to get the
amendment passed, “there will be a very considerable proportion of the people
opposed to it”). The author goes on to predict that enforcing the amendment
would be near impossible without widespread support, and those hostile to the
cause would unite together and get it repealed. Id. He was correct.
84. See Prohibition, supra note 82 (noting that as the Great Depression
wore on, criminal activity linked to bootlegging continued to rise, and support
for Prohibition began to wane). Many people viewed legalizing alcohol as a
way to create jobs and raise tax revenue. Id. Franklin D. Roosevelt ran for
president on a platform that included Prohibition’s repeal. Id. Roosevelt won,
and the amendment repealing Prohibition was ratified in December 1933. Id.
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amendment, called a “debt brake,” was enacted in 2009 and
requires the federal government to run a deficit of no more than
0.35 percent of its gross domestic product.85 In addition, a special
account is set up to track any incidental deficit spending.86 Under
the “debt brake,” the government must balance this account over
the course of the business cycle87 by repaying any debts it incurs.88
This method allows the government to run a debt in emergency
situations with a simple majority vote in Parliament, so long as
there is a schedule outlining how the debt will be repaid.89 The
“debt brake” is a mainly procedural BBA.90 It sets an overall
constraint on spending, but does not address how it is to be done.91
The Swiss version of the “debt brake,” approved in 2001, is
similar to Germany’s.92 Switzerland, however, limits yearly
government expenditures to an estimate of the coming year’s
revenue.93 If the government overspends, it must reduce spending
in subsequent years to make up for the deficit.94 In addition, the
rule also requires a surplus when the economy is booming, so these
excess expenditures may already be covered by a previous year’s
85. Klaus Dieter John, A System Dynamics Approach to Macroeconomic
Policy Evaluation – The Case of the German Debt Brake, CHEMNITZ U. TECH.
12,
http://www.systemdynamics.org/conferences/2011/proceed/papers/P1335.pdf
(last visited Feb. 17, 2013); see also Thushyanthan Baskaran & Lars P. Feld,
Federalism Commission II – Recent Reforms of Federal-Länder Financial
Relationships in Germany, RUPRECHT-KARLS-U. HEIDELBERG 1-4, 17-18,
http://www.forumfed.org/en/pubs/2009-10-26-feld.pdf (last visited Feb. 17,
2013) (exploring the German debt problems that led to the BBA and whether
the author believes it will achieve its purpose). The author concludes that the
new regulations will help solve the country’s public debt problem, but they
should have required more than a qualified majority to allow debt spending
and had the debt brake sufficiently cover “communities, Social Security
systems, and special purpose funds.” Id. at 17.
86. John, supra note 85, at 12.
87. See
Kimberly
Amadeo,
Business
Cycle,
ABOUT.COM,
http://useconomy.about .com/od/glossary/g/business_cycle.htm (last updated
Oct. 28, 2011) (defining the business cycle as “periods of growth and decline as
an economy”). The cycle contains four stages: contraction, trough, expansion,
and peak. Id. This is appropriate for a BBA as it allows the government to
adjust budgets over time, rather than scramble to alter the budget when there
are unforeseeable yearly fluctuations.
88. John, supra note 85, at 12.
89. Id.
90. See Buchanan, supra note 20, at 350-51 (describing what a
“procedural,” rather than substantive, rule is).
91. Id.
92. See generally Frank Bodmer, The Swiss Debt Brake: How It Works and
What Can Go Wrong, 142 SWISS J. ECON. STAT. 307, 307 (2006), available at
http://www.sjes.ch/ papers/2006-III-1.pdf; see also Tie Your Hands, Please,
ECONOMIST (Dec. 10, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/21541459 (noting
that Switzerland already passed a similar “debt brake”).
93. Id. at 308, 317-18.
94. Id.
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surplus.95 Excess spending does not need to be accounted for if
both chambers of Parliament vote to allow it.96 Like Germany, the
Swiss amendment does not contain substantive provisions. Under
this BBA, the Swiss government has been running a surplus since
2006.97
The German and Swiss BBAs adhere to two of the three
constitutional considerations outlined above. First, neither of the
plans contain any partisan ideology. The legislators in the country
still control exactly how they spend, they are just limited to a
mathematically produced limit that can be overruled by a
supermajority vote.98 The scheme is also designed to be flexible, as
the governments can still run deficits or surpluses as they please if
they make a plan to balance the budget over the course of the
business cycle or vote on an increase.99 However, the specificity of
these foreign provisions would conflict with the United States’
Constitution’s
history
of
broadly
worded,
aspirational
statements.100 Certainly, the United States cannot amend its
Constitution nearly as easily as many European nations.101
95. Id. at 308.
96. Id. at 309.
97. See Government at a Glance 2011 Country Note: Switzerland, ORG. FOR
ECON.
CO-OPERATION
AND
DEV.
1
(June
24,
2011),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/32/47876
643.pdf
(mentioning
that
Switzerland has maintained a budget surplus since 2006, even through a
recession in 2009). The document also provides various indicators on the
government’s performance and a survey of its structure and economic system.
Id.
98. See supra notes 85-96 and accompanying text (describing how the
European BBA models function).
99. Id.
100. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (illustrating how the
broadly worded, aspirational statements of the Constitution ensures that it
garners support with the majority of citizens and allows it to adapt to societal
changes).
101. See Patrick Bahners, What Distinguishes Germany’s Basic Law from
the United States Constitution?, NOTRE DAME NEWS (May 18, 2009),
http://newsinfo.nd.edu/news/
11779-human-dignity-and-freedom-rights/
(explaining that the United States Constitution is designed to be a framework
that does not require much change). Germany’s Constitution, on the other
hand, is a cross between a legal code and a constitution that requires constant
amendments. Id. The analogy to the legal code comes from the fact that it
must cover a large range of topics in great detail that necessitates continual
growth. Id. The American Constitution has been changed only twenty-seven
times throughout its history while the German Constitution has been altered
fifty-five times in sixty-one years. Id.; see also BJØRN ERIK RASCH & ROGER D.
CONGLETON, Amendment Procedures and Constitutional Stability, in
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND PUBLIC POLICY, ANALYSIS AND
EVIDENCE 536, 536-37 (Roger D. Congleton & Birgitta Swedenborg eds., 2005),
available
at
http://rdc1.net/forthcoming/D
CD%20(Chap%2012,%20Amendment%20Procedures,%20Congleton%20and%2
0Rausch).pdf (discussing whether there is a correlation between the
stringency of amendment procedures and constitutional stability). The authors

Do Not Delete

600

3/12/2013 7:22 PM

The John Marshall Law Review

[46:583

Therefore, a mathematically produced spending limit requiring
occasional adjustment over time is not feasible for the United
States.102
American BBA proposals differ significantly in their
approach. Besides mandating that the government pass a
balanced budget,103 they contain various substantive provisions
meant to limit how and when money can be spent.104 The most
common methods employed to achieve this are to limit spending as
a percentage of GDP and require more than a simple majority vote
to increase tax revenues, both of which conflict with wellestablished Constitutional principles.105
First, these proposals are not broad, aspirational statements.
They specifically address rules that govern how the government
achieves an end.106 If public sentiment is conceptually behind a
balanced budget, then a BBA should reflect just that. The
additional substantive provisions transform the proposal from a
reflection of societal aspirations to an ordinary piece of partisan
legislation. This has no place in the Constitution.107
Second, these American proposals are not flexible enough to

conclude that in general, tougher amendment procedures affect the “frequency
of formal changes to modern democratic constitutions” and create more
“predictable” politics. Id. at 536-37, 548-49. The chapter also contains a chart
comparing the amendment procedures of the world’s major democracies. Id. at
551-52.
102. For instance, if the United States adopted a plan similar to Germany’s
and wanted to later change their deficit limit from 0.35 percent of GDP to 0.40
percent of GDP, the nominal change would require the government to go
through the entire constitutional amendment process all over again. U.S.
CONST. art. V. No provision in the Constitution suggests minor amendments
may bypass the Article V process. Id.
103. See e.g., H.J. Res. 1, 104th Cong. (1995) (proposing that “[t]otal outlays
for any fiscal year shall not exceed total receipts or that fiscal year”); see also
H.J. Res. 10, 112th Cong. (2011) (requiring a balanced budget where “[t]otal
outlays for any fiscal year shall not exceed total receipts for that fiscal year”).
104. See supra note 43-44 and accompanying text (showing examples of
substantive provisions that establish spending caps and require supermajority approval for bills containing revenue increases or an increase in the
debt ceiling).
105. See supra note 28-30 and accompanying text (explaining the provisions
of the 1982, 1995, and 1997 BBA proposals containing substantive provisions);
see also H.R.J. Res. 1, 112th Congress (2011) (requiring a three-fifths vote of
each house to increase the public debt limit, a majority vote in each house
before any bill increasing revenue can become law, and a two-thirds vote in
each house to spend more than twenty percent of GDP).
106. See SATURNO & LYNCH, supra note 31, at 29-40 (analyzing typical BBA
provisions, some of which specifically govern how the government is to achieve
an overall balanced budget). For instance, some provisions seek to exempt
specific expenses or activities, limit the government’s ability to tax or spend, or
require a specific method of budgetary estimates. Id. at 30-31, 34, 36.
107. See supra text accompanying note 67 (discussing how amendments are
drafted to reflect a societal change in attitude).
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work over time. Articulating a specific spending limit as a
percentage of GDP may reduce spending, but changes in the size of
the economy could unnecessarily constrain Congress from using
their enumerated spending power. For instance, if Congress is
limited to spending no more than eighteen percent of GDP, and it
can produce a budget surplus by doing so, it would be barred from
spending that additional money.108 In the case of prohibiting
revenue increases without a supermajority vote, it simply takes
away a viable means to achieve the goal of a balanced budget.109
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the proposals being
offered include specific partisan ideology, namely attempts to limit
the size of the federal government and hinder any new tax
legislation.110 These issues have been constantly debated since the
United States’ inception and remain a significant point of
contention between opposing political and societal factions.111
Enacting such an amendment would alienate a significant portion
of the population and immediately create debates best kept to the
legislative process.
These typical BBA proposals would conflict with the
Constitution in varying degrees, even if they achieved a balanced
budget. Any adopted BBA must be stripped of any substantive
provisions because they would inevitably be partisan, therefore
alienating the sponsors’ opponents and the opponent’s supporters.
IV. PROPOSAL
Having identified the typical characteristics of a BBA and the
constitutional considerations they must adhere to, this Comment
now proposes a purely procedural BBA112 that is fit for the
Constitution. This section also discusses some of the issues the
government will face during the amendment’s implementation,
108. If the eighteen percent of GDP was, for example, $1 trillion and
revenue reached $1.3 trillion, the government would not be allowed to spend
the $300 billion surplus.
109. In effect, this makes it exceedingly difficult to raise any revenue to
close budget deficits, so legislators are limited to cutting spending and finding
savings.
110. See supra text accompanying note 45 (discussing that some politicians
see a BBA amendment as a way to limit the federal government and limit
Congress’s ability to collect taxes).
111. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Appetite for Budget Bill, but Success Is in
TIMES
(Nov.
10,
2011),
Doubt,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/11/us/politics/competing-balanced-budgetproposals-headed-for-votes.html?_r=2&hp
(reporting
the
fundamental
partisan difference present in the BBA debate, particularly the battle over
how much restrictions it should place on spending and taxing). The article also
points out that this debate has been in place since Thomas Jefferson suggested
removing the government’s ability to incur debt. Id.
112. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (explaining what a
“procedural,” rather than a “substantive,” amendment entails).
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and give a brief synopsis on how it will work.
A. An Aspirational BBA Mandating Fiscal Responsibility
The text of an adopted BBA must be a broad, aspirational
statement.113 The language must be flexible enough to adapt to
changes in society114 and be free from partisan ideology. The best
way to achieve this is through a procedural BBA open to
interpretation and free from any provisions that mandate how the
government is to achieve a balanced budget. The amendment
should read:
Section 1. Congress shall pass no budget in which total
governmental expenditures exceed total governmental receipts.
During times of war or emergency, Congress may waive this
provision subject to a majority vote in each House of Congress and a
signature by the President.
Section 2. Any expenditures in excess of receipts for a given year
must be accounted for in subsequent budgets, bringing balance to
the federal budget over time.

This broad language reflects society’s aspirations of achieving
a balanced budget without limiting any of the means available to
politicians through the ordinary legislative process. The
amendment simply requires that a balanced budget be passed
each year, the budget stay in balance over time, and waiver only
be permitted if the legislative and executive branches agree to do
so. The process of deciding how to allocate funds is left completely
unchanged.
The proposed language of the amendment is also flexible
enough to adapt to unforeseen developments. For example, the
provision may be waived in times of war or emergency, when
deficit spending may be appropriate.115 Also, if the government
engages in deficit spending due to a shortfall in revenue or
increased expenses, it does not need to drastically alter spending
the very next year to make up for the deficit. Section 2 requires
that the budget remain balanced over time, similar to the business

113. See Staudt, supra note 26, at 1151-52 (describing how BBA proposals
“carry symbolic meaning beyond mere political rhetoric” in the eyes of its
supporters). Some view the movement to amend the Constitution as a
reflection “of a fundamental change in the public’s viewpoint” and an assertion
that the government should conduct itself in accordance with a certain
fundamental value. Id.
114. See supra text accompanying note 59-60 (articulating the necessity for
an amendment to remain flexible so that it may adapt to changes in society
and stay relevant).
115. See BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2012,
supra note 5, at 5 (recounting how until the 1980s, large deficits were only
present during times of war or recession, where it is seen as necessary to avoid
further hardships).
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cycle provisions of the European models.116 But, unlike the
business cycle provision, the flexibility of the proposed provision
allows the government to make up for the deficits when it is
capable of doing so, rather than requiring sudden spending cuts or
revenue increases.117
The proposed amendment language is purposely broad so
words like “time,” “expenditures,” “receipts,” and “emergency” are
open for interpretation.118 For instance, the requirement of a
balanced budget over “time” can conform to the state of the
economy. Where an overrun is minor, the legislature may act the
very next year to account for the deficit, or it may have a surplus
from a previous year that can account for the deficit
immediately.119 However, if the economy is in a prolonged
economic slump or recession where deficits are uncontrollable due
to the circumstances, then the government may allow itself to
account for the deficits at the appropriate time in the future.120 In
opposite, a stringent requirement that demands a balanced budget
over a set period of time unnecessarily constrains the
government’s ability to alter spending when it may be
inappropriate or harmful to the country.121
Similarly, sentence two of Section 1 allows the legislature to
decide what events constitute times of “war” or “emergency” by
approving the waiver with a majority vote in each House, rather
than having it rely on an enumerated list of exceptions or strict

116. See supra notes 85-96 and accompanying text (explaining how the
European BBAs require that spending be balanced over the course of the
business cycle, allowing deficits incurred to be paid over time).
117. Id.
118. The BBA proposal uses the terms “time,” “expenditures,” and
“receipts,” as used in the Appropriations Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
The Appropriations Clause commands that a record of all government receipts
and expenditures be “published from time to time.” Id. The court could have
specified a specific term, but evidently found it appropriate to allow other
entities to designate the appropriate timeframe. This BBA proposal adopts
this notion in allowing the government to define what duration of “time” the
budget should be balanced over. Id. Similarly, the government is free to decide
what constitutes a “receipt” or “expenditure,” as it does in relation to the
Appropriations Clause. Id.
119. See, e.g., Bodmer, supra note 92, at 308-10 (explaining how the Swiss
BBA aims for a budget surplus of two percent over the course of the business
cycle and mandates a surplus during strong economic periods). This allows for
the possibility of deficit spending in a given year without the need for
repayment. Id.
120. Id.
121. See, e.g, KEITH BEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22239, EMERGENCY
SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR HURRICANE KATRINA RELIEF CRS-1
(2006) (summarizing the two emergency appropriation bills passed in
Congress in 2005 that allocated $62.3 billion to the Hurricane Katrina relief
effort). A strict balanced budget would hinder necessary expenditures such as
this.
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definition of the terms. The legislative and executive bodies in
power are in the best position to determine when extraordinary
circumstances demand governmental action. Some BBA critics
opine that a strict BBA will limit the government’s ability to act
decisively,122 but this amendment’s language is broad enough to
ensure that it will never do so. Only a failure to garner a majority
vote in both Houses of Congress or the President’s refusal to sign
off on the waiver can prevent action.123
Finally, the purely procedural amendment is free from any
partisan ideology in that it mandates Congress to not spend more
than it takes in, but does not dictate how. It does not prescribe nor
proscribe Congress from using any particular means of achieving a
balanced budget, as many of the BBA proposals do in a brazen
attempt to have their party’s philosophy embedded in the
Constitution.124 The amendment is designed so the legislative
process already in place is responsible for any spending decisions.
B. Implementation and the Effect of the Amendment
The implementation of the BBA will require Congress to
make some difficult decisions.125 The most important of these
being how long the government has to reach the initial balanced
budget, which accounting procedures are going to be used in
calculating the budget,126 and how the current budget deficits are
122. See A Balanced Budget Amendment Isn’t the Answer, WASH. POST (July
14,
2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-balanced-budgetamendment-isnt-the-answer/2011/07/12/gIQACyhzEI_story.html (arguing that
a BBA that caps spending at a certain percent will prevent legislatures from
spending in times of emergency, hurting the economy). The editorial
hypothesizes that if a BBA was in effect during the 2008 economic crash,
Congress would have been unable to provide stimulus and stabilize banks. Id.
123. The text of the amendment purposely does not include a provision that
would allow Congress to override the President’s refusal to sign off on a
waiver. This is because the President is in the best position to act as a check to
Congress in the event it tries to circumvent the amendment. If a President
attempts to circumvent the amendment by granting unnecessary waivers,
American citizens may easily voice their displeasure by voting for someone
else. If Congress could override the President and was unnecessarily
authorizing deficit spending, it would be difficult for citizens to identify all the
Congressmen who were at fault and vote them out of office.
124. See supra note 28-30, 93 and accompanying text (outlining BBA
proposals that try to limit the size of government, a partisan ideology, by
requiring such things as supermajority votes to raise taxes and spending caps
as a percentage of GDP).
125. See Seto, supra note 7, at 1472, 1478, 1493, 1507-16 (exploring some of
the concerns present in a BBA implementation, including what transitional
period is appropriate, which programs will be included in the federal budget,
which particular accounting method should be used, and who should judge and
enforce compliance with the amendment).
126. See id. at 1478-91 (analyzing the complex set of accounting issues that
would have to be determined in implementing a BBA). For instance, the
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to be closed.
Unlike this Comment’s proposed BBA, most American BBA
proposals contain express provisions governing how this is to be
done.127 However, if the text of these amendments needed even a
slight adjustment in the future, an additional amendment would
have to be ratified.128 The United States has never attempted to
restrict its spending in this manner, and for the country to be
shackled by a BBA that contains a misjudgment would prove
disastrous.129 This proposal avoids such a pitfall by leaving the
decisions to the traditional legislative process, which allows trial
and error to take place.130 The government will be free to debate
and explore all implementation options knowing they will be able
to adjust any errors in the future with relative ease.
Congress already has extensive experience making many of
these implementation decisions. Adjustments on how the federal
budget is calculated, for instance, are already made frequently.131
Congress is free to continue using the current budget calculation
government must decide how future obligations should factor into the yearly
budget. Id. at 1483. If one large payment of $5 billion is due in five years,
should the government account for that amount slowly over that time period
or simply be saddled with it the year is comes due? Id. Similarly, Social
Security currently has a minimal impact on our budget, but will balloon as the
baby boomer generation begins to collect benefits. Id. at 1484. Congress must
decide if those future payments should be accounted for in the current budget
or factor in the payments as they come due. Id. It would be difficult to believe
all these scenarios could be accounted for with express provisions in a BBA.
127. See H.J. Res. 10, 112th Cong. (2011) (taking effect “beginning with the
later of the second fiscal year beginning after its ratification or the first fiscal
year beginning after December 31, 2020.”); see also H.J. Res. 4 112th Cong.
(2011) (excluding borrowed money from receipt calculations and debt
payments from outlay calculations); H.J. Res. 41, 112th Cong. (2011)
(mandating a balanced budget without reducing disbursements of the Federal
Disability Trust Fund or the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust
Fund).
128. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (providing a practical
example of how this would be difficult in effect).
129. See supra note 58, 82-83 and accompanying text (showing that respect
for the Constitution has survived so long because people respect its provisions
and illustrating how an unpopular amendment that proves difficult to enforce,
like Prohibition, can lead to its repeal).
130. Legislators are free to pass and repeal legislation with a majority vote
in each House of Congress and the signature of the President. U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 7. There is no limitation on how often this power may be used. Id.
131. See Larry DeWitt, Research Note #20: The Social Security Trust Funds
SEC.
(Mar.
4,
2005),
and
the
Federal
Budget,
SOC.
http://www.ssa.gov/history/BudgetTreatment .html (updated June 18, 2007)
(recounting how Social Security was off budget from its inception to 1968, back
on budget until 1985, then back off budget from 1986-1990, except for deficit
computation purposes, and now off budget again for all purposes); see also
Introduction to the Federal Budget Process, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POL’Y
PRIORITIES (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.cbpp.org/files/3-7-03bud.pdf (explaining
the process of how a budget is passed).
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model or alter it to better conform to the necessities of a successful
BBA. Projected revenues for the coming year are also already
determined in the budget process.132 Congress only needs to debate
how it will stay within that figure or change how it is calculated.
As shown, the legislative process in place is designed to make
these difficult decisions, and this BBA utilizes that proven
process.133
Once these implementation decisions are made and the
transitional period has elapsed, Congress will be required to create
a balanced budget using the same process it has used since its
inception. Debates will ensue, compromises will be made, and the
government will continue to function. In subsequent years, the
health of the economy will dictate whether legislators decide to
build a surplus for future years, pay off unforeseen deficits from
previous years, or just pass a balanced budget. Inevitably, there
will be unanticipated events that will require the government to
interpret the amendment in deciding how to act in accordance
with it. But this uncertainty should not be feared. Instead, it
should be embraced as an opportunity to apply the brilliant
framework that is the Constitution and develop a solution that
will strengthen the United States.
V. CONCLUSION
If a BBA is passed, it needs to use the framework of the
Constitution itself to be successful. Politicians are mistaken to
believe that they can draft a specific economic blueprint that can
be enshrined in the Constitution and withstand the test of time.
An amendment that reflects an overall aspiration of our society, is
free from divisive partisanship, and is flexible enough to conform
to the ever-changing landscape of our country will demand respect
and truly reflect the spirit of the Constitution of the United States
of America.

132. See BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2012,
supra note 5, at 23 (projecting government receipts of $2.627 billion for 2012).
The budget also projects receipts through 2016. Id.
133. See Great and Extraordinary Occasions, supra note 57, at vii (stating
that the Constitution is durable because the broad language of the document
allows a society a wide range of policy choice). Decisions are left to members of
the democracy who are free to debate and judge ideas without fearing that
they will have to be locked “into a policy choice for all time.” Id.

